Hi Rodrigo, On Sat, 20 Jul 2024 16:34:47 +0200 Rodrigo Arias <rodarima@gmail.com> wrote:
+ if (unveil("/home", "rwc") == -1) {
We may want to constraint this a bit further, so a malicious actor cannot read anything from /home/.config. Maybe only /home/.dillo and the downloads directory would be suitable?
Absolutely, that was my initial intention, but just wanted to keep the example patch as simple as possible. There are a number of things in $HOME which we probably don't want the browser having access to.
+ if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath inet unix dns tty proc prot_exec",
Does this work with plugins, when the dpid daemon is not running?, as I believe it has to fork and exec the dpid program.
I started with a mindset of "whats the bare minimum of permissions we can get away with". But its clear that we would need "exec" as well for full functionality. At some point I may try to submit an improved patch to the OpenBSD ports maintainers. Unfortunately that won't do much for users of Linux and other systems. -Alex